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Abstract 
 
This paper is part of the general debate about the need to rethink economics as a human discipline 
using a heuristic to describe its object, about the need to explicitly reject the positivistic approach in 
neoclassical economics, and about the urgency to adopt a different methodology, grounded on a 
realistic set of initial assumptions able to cope with the complexity of the decision making process. The 
aim of this paper is to show the use of Occam’s razor in the economic debate around realism in 
economic modelling. Occam’s razor can be intended as a principle of logic that emphasises simplicity, 
or as a heuristic tool that emphasises parsimony. Neoclassical economists, such as Samuelson, have 
explicitly used Occam’s razor as a logical principle to highlight the strict logic and simplicity of 
neoclassical economics; neoclassical models, however, are based on unrealistic assumptions. Some 
approaches of heterodox economics, au contraire, have used Occam’s razor as a powerful heuristic tool 
to emphasise parsimony, building up models grounded on realistic initial assumptions and capable of 
embedding complexity into the general explanation of economic behaviour, as in Simon’s bounded 
rationality (1955; 1957) and Hayek’s notion of human rationality (1948; 1952; 1974) and cultural and 
social evolution (1967; 1978).  
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Introduction 
 
Occam’s razor was formulated during the Middle Ages by Doctor Invincibilis, alias William of 
Occam (circa 1290-1349). Occam’s razor states that of two competing theories, the simpler 
and more parsimonious is preferred. It derives from a more general application of Occam’s 
philosophical outlook (according to which any knowledge is supposed to be grounded only on 
experience), and on a complete rejection of any traditional aspect of Aristotelian metaphysics 
(upon which traditional Scholastics had been developed). Simplicity (entia non sunt 
multiplicanda praeter necessitate, which means ‘entities are not to be multiplied beyond 
necessity’) and parsimony (frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora, which means ‘in 
vain is that explained by many things which can be explained by fewer things’) 
 
are the two 
blades of Occam’s razor.  
Although simplicity and parsimony are related, they are not the same: simplicity is 
related to the capacity of a model to describe a complex phenomenon in a ‘sophisticatedly 
simple way’ (Zellner, 2001; 242); parsimony is ‘a proper subset of simplicity’ and it involves a 
paucity of factors (Jensen, 2001; 283). Hence, Occam’s razor can be defined as follows: ‘the 
widely held principle of science that the simplest (often shortest) explanation that is adequate 
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in number and type of assumptions (simplicity) and in technique (elegance) to explain the 
observed facts is the criterion by which to prefer explanations’ (Reid, 1987, 551n).  
Because Occam’s razor advocates simplicity and parsimony, it influenced many 
philosophers and has been considered the most suitable tool to explain and predict 
phenomena not only in physics
1
 but also in other fields, including economics. Hicks (1938) 
first introduced Occam’s razor into economics, in terms of parsimony, to exclude the 
measurability of consumer utility (Pfouts, 2002). Samuelson (1947) and Friedman (1953) 
gave precedence to simplicity in their economic modelling.  
In this paper I consider the two blades of Occam’s razor – simplicity and parsimony – 
as the tools adopted respectively by neoclassical economics and by heterodox economics. 
Simplicity is the capacity to reduce complexity in building up a model, while parsimony is the 
capacity to reduce the number of factors included in a model. While simplicity emphasises 
logic, parsimony emphasises heuristic. By complexity is meant a non-equilibrium view of the 
economy, where actions and strategies constantly evolve (Arthur, 2014). Heuristic is intended 
as a specific feature of human behaviour under certain circumstances when agents adopt 
mental shortcuts in order to make decisions faster and more frugally (Gigerenzer and Todd, 
1999).
2
 
The use of the first blade of Occam’s razor implies a trade-off between simplicity and 
realism: a simpler model is more logical, but less realistic.
3
 The lack of realism has two 
sources: the concept of the agent as homo oeconomicus, and the lack of structure – that is 
those institutions which promote methodological and ontological individualism. Conversely the 
use of the second blade of Occam’s razor increases realism: parsimony reduces the number 
of factors included in a model by adopting only factors that are real.
4
  
Let’s consider the nature of rationality, as an application of the two blades of Occam’s 
razor by neoclassical economics and heterodox economics respectively. On one side, 
neoclassical economics adopts full rationality in the name of simplicity (as in Friedman’s as if 
assumption, see section 1). This adoption of full rationality implies an infinite amount of 
information as if it was available to agents and it implies a capacity by agents to handle that 
information. This process is logical but it is neither parsimonious (because the amount of 
information is infinite) nor realistic (because no agent is capable of acquiring or processing an 
infinite amount of information). On the other side, heterodox economics adopts bounded or 
                                                          
1
 Leibnitz and Newton used Occam’s razor to drop any metaphysical residual from science. During the 
last century, Mach’s principle of ‘the economy of science’ unified the methodology of Occam’s razor 
along with the idea of an economy of nature, according to which nature is an organised and frugal 
system (Mach, 1960[1883]). Mach’s formulation reinforced the pure theoretical principle of simplicity with 
the more operative principle of parsimony, according to the Occam’s razor tradition. During the 1920s, 
the revival of Occam’s razor had particularly taken place in European continental philosophy, especially 
in Schlick’s circle (Vienna) as well as in Reichenbach’s group (Berlin). 
2
 As Peter Cserne suggested in his comments on this paper, there is an ambiguity in defining heuristic 
as a methodological rule of thumb, as it is possible to apply the notion of ‘rule of thumb’ either to 
economic agents’ decisions or to researchers developing theories. According to Cserne, this ambiguity 
may be partially resolved by describing theory building as a special case of human decision-making. 
3
 A caveat on realism: as Mäki pointed out, scientific realism is not a uniform doctrine: ‘while economists 
use the term “realism” to refer to a presumed property of theories, philosophers use it to denote a theory 
of theories’. Hence, Mäki suggested that ‘realism’, as used by economists, should be replaced by 
‘realisticness’, i.e. ‘a property of theoretical representations as adopted by economists and philosophers 
of economics’ (Mäki, 1998a, p. 304). While I agree with Mäki’s distinction, I do prefer to use the term 
‘realism’ in this paper, as it is accepted by scholars of both disciplines. I owe this caveat to Fleetwood’s 
comment of this paper. 
4
 Hirschman (1984) gave an alternative interpretation of ‘parsimony’: he identified parsimony with the 
abstraction of rational choice theory. According to Hirschman “[the] parsimonious postulate: that of the 
self- interested, isolated individual who chooses freely and rationally between alternative courses of 
action after computing their prospective costs and benefits” (p. 11) presumes to explain even 
noneconomic phenomena, such as family and crime. Hirschman was implicitly criticising Becker’s notion 
of human economic behaviour (Becker, 1976). 
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limited rationality and heuristic in the name of parsimony (as in Simon or Hayek, see section 
2). The notion of bounded/limited rationality reduces the quantity of information available and 
forces economic agents to adopt a heuristic in order to make a decision, as opposed to 
maximising an expected utility function as logic demands. This process is parsimonious (the 
amount of information is less than in the previous model) and more realistic (a heuristic, such 
as rule of thumb, is de facto adopted by agents to make a decision).  
Let’s consider the nature of ‘economics as a science’ as another example of the 
application of the two blades of Occam’s razor by neoclassical economics and by heterodox 
economics (see section 1 and 2). On one side, the use of the logical blade (=simplicity), 
adopted by Samuelson, Friedman and neoclassical economists, reduces economics (the 
science which describes economic individual and social behaviour) to physics (the science 
which describes nature). This operation is ‘meaningful’ (in Samuelson’s terms) because it 
reduces complexity, i.e. it makes it simpler to describe economic phenomena if we consider 
decision makers as if they were atoms following natural laws, like decreasing marginal utility. 
A trade-off between simplicity and realism emerges again when economic agents, either 
individual or social, are compared with physical atoms. On the opposite side, the use of the 
heuristic blade (=parsimony) adopted by heterodox economics, increases realism by avoiding 
the conflation of economics and physics. 
It is as a logical principle that gives precedence to simplicity that Occam’s razor has 
been used in neoclassical economics and econometrics. We can see this in Samuelson’s 
revealed preference theory, Friedman’s concept of positive economics and Becker’s model of 
the consumer (Wong, 2006). In econometrics, Keuzenkamp and McAleer (1995) explicitly 
used Occam’s razor to develop simple models; those models, however, are not parsimonious, 
because parsimony implies an insufficient number of parameters. In using Occam’s razor as a 
pure logical tool, one that gives precedence to the simplicity of a model, neoclassical 
economics incurs a fault: it neglects the reality that in the human sciences a trade-off exists 
between simplicity and realism, and this trade-off cannot be confused with the degree of 
abstraction that characterises the object of any natural science, like physics, because human 
behaviour cannot be compared with the behaviour of, say, atoms.  
It is as a heuristic that puts emphasis on parsimony that Occam’s razor has been 
used by heterodox economists, invoking a rule of thumb. Examples are Simon’s bounded 
rationality and Hayek’s approach to complex phenomena. In using Occam’s razor as a 
heuristic tool, heterodox economics leverages an advantage: it permits a more realistic 
description of individual behaviour (under whatever constraint) because it implies the adoption 
of a rule of thumb (based on a realistic scenario in which individuals are not fully rational 
maximisers). The advantages of using Occam’s razor as a heuristic rule of thumb is that it 
allows economists to develop their theories in a way that does justice to, rather than assumes 
away, the complexity of their subject matter, as in the case of Simon’s bounded rationality and 
Hayek’s theory of the social world and complex phenomena.  
 
1. Neoclassical economics’ adoption of Occam’s razor simplicity blade: the role of 
logic 
 
Neoclassical economics, which became the mainstream within the discipline in the mid-1950s 
(Colander, 2000; Dequech, 2007), had intended Occam razor’s as a pure logical principle. 
The success (in the sense of becoming mainstream) of a paradigm (neoclassical economics) 
has many reasons behind it. It has been often remarked how neoclassical economics had 
formally reached a cognitive status as well as a scientific respectability due to the general 
agreement around neoclassical results, focused on general economic equilibrium and rational 
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choice theory (Weintraub, 2007). Both general economic equilibrium and rational choice 
theory adopt a set of initial methodological assumptions that are ‘occamite’, when Occam’s 
razor is intended in a pure logical sense. The assumptions are the simplest possible (an 
economic agent is able to rank her preferences, which are transitive, complete and technically 
convex) and suggest a unique way of reasoning (given a budget constraint, a utility function is 
expected to be maximised in order to achieve the optimum). 
Occam’s razor logical blade is fashionable in neoclassical economics because it 
becomes the essential route towards elucidating a simpler description of individual and social 
dynamics in order to explain economic phenomena, albeit simpler does not always mean 
clearer. Furthermore, Occam’s razor logical blade matches the urgency to express models
5
 
as well as initial assumptions in mathematical terms. The advantage of using a formal 
language is twofold: it avoids any possible linguistic misunderstanding,
6
 and it makes 
explanations as simple as they can be.  
The immediate example of the application of such a scheme within the natural 
sciences is physics. In fact, neoclassical economists have modelled the discipline on physics 
in order to become a positive science. The process of modelling economics as physics 
started with the rise of marginalism (at the end of the 19
th
 century) and continued until the 
final systematisation of general economic equilibrium (in the 1930s through the 1950s), 
ultimately becoming the dominant style of neoclassical economics within the mainstream 
(Weintraub, 1985; Mirowski ,1989; 2002; Lawson, 2013). According to Mirowski (1989), it was 
Fisher who first tried to apply physics to economics, without understanding the differences 
between their domains, and, according to Boumans (1993), it was Tinbergen who introduced 
the concept of ‘formal analogies’ between physics and economics without drawing any 
substantial analogy between their domains.
7
 
Why do physicists and neoclassical economists consider simplicity (the logic blade of 
Occam’s razor) the best way to develop a theory? The answer seems immediately apparent: 
because in a simpler framework, mistakes are reduced. Although both physicists and 
neoclassical economists are aware that making Occam’s razor operational in a non-arbitrary 
way can be difficult, they accept Occam’s razor as a logical principle because it makes it 
easier to match theoretical knowledge with actual behaviour (as in Mach’s economic principle 
of the economy of science).
8
 
The analogy between physics and neoclassical economics is fundamental in the 
history of the discipline: in Samuelson’s Foundations, this analogy has been modelled on the 
assumption that both physical and economic phenomena can be described and explained in 
the same terms. Both are in fact based on the existence of operationally meaningful theorems 
as well as on ‘the existence of a general theory which underlies the particular theories and 
unifies them with respect to those central features’ (Samuelson, 1947, 3). By a meaningful 
theorem, Samuelson means ‘simply a hypothesis about empirical data which could 
conceivably be refuted, if only under ideal conditions’ (Samuelson, 1947, 4), and by 
‘operational’ he means a theorem that can be empirically tested. According to Samuelson, 
‘meaningful theorems exist in economics and they proceed from two hypotheses: any 
                                                          
5
 Given the ambiguity of the term ‘model’, I will be following Mäki’s definition of models as 
representations of some target or as surrogate systems (Mäki, 2009a). 
6
 However it may create its own misunderstanding, of a non-linguistic variety. 
7
 Even though the introduction of models in economics has reduced the naturalism of the discipline 
(Sugden, 2000; Morgan, 2012; Mäki, 2013), philosophers such as Cartwright (1999) defined economics’ 
attitude to consider itself as a natural science, by following an ‘imperialistic tendency’, bound to fall into 
the trap of methodological fundamentalism. 
8
 The use of Occam’s razor purely as a logical tool causes many other problems: for instance, what is 
the best way to measure simplicity, or how simplicity and empirical models are reciprocally related 
(Zellner et al., 2001).  
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equilibrium is a result of a process of maximisation (minimisation), and the stability of 
equilibrium’ (Samuelson, 1947, p. 5).
9
  
Along with Samuelson’s modelling economics as a physical science, there is 
Friedman’s modelling economics as a positive science. Friedman defined positive economics 
as ‘an objective science, in the same sense as any of the physical sciences’ (Friedman, 1953, 
p. 4);
10
 and behind Samuelson’s and Friedman’s neoclassical economics there is the 
emergence of rational choice theory, i.e., the transformation of individuals into economic 
agents whose behaviour can be reduced to uniformity, just as can the behaviour of physical 
atoms.  
This process is made possible by the introduction of an axiomatic system to describe 
human preferences and of a mathematical language to describe human utility in order to 
explain individual decision making (including any decision making under uncertainty) as 
cohesive. In fact, from a methodological point of view, Samuelson approaches Friedman in 
considering the instrumental role of theory in maximising behaviour in building up economic 
models of equilibrium. Samuelson wrote:  
 
‘In cases where the equilibrium values of our variable can be regarded as the 
solutions of an extremum (maximum or minimum) problem, it is often possible 
regardless of the number of variables involved to determine unambiguously 
the qualitative behaviour of our solution values in respect to changes of 
parameters (…). It is possible to derive operationally meaningful restrictive 
hypotheses in consumers’ behaviour so as to maximise an ordinal preference 
scale of quantities of consumption goods and services’ (Samuelson 1947, pp. 
21-22). 
 
The microeconomic process of maximising expected utility functions combines individual 
dynamics with the static stability of the final equilibrium in the economic system, as happens 
in physics. This interpretation describes the logic mechanism of the economic system as if it 
determined the logic of the economic maximising agent (Davis, 2003).  
By adopting Occam’s razor as a purely logical tool that gives precedence to 
simplicity, neoclassical economists are able to model economics as a physical and positive 
science. In order to make this theoretical operation possible, some fundamentals (listed 
below) have been accepted by neoclassical economists, and they form the pillars of 
neoclassical economics: 
 
                                                          
9
 In his epistemic position, Samuelson was influenced by Bridgman’s operationalism in physics and by 
early logical positivism: ‘his view of scientific theories [was] descriptivist: scientific theories merely 
describe the empirical evidence and do not go beyond the evidence to explain any deeper, underlying, 
or hidden causes of the phenomena’ (Hands, 2001, p. 63). 
10
 Friedman’s positive economics stands in contrast to normative economics as it implies the 
independence of economics from any particular ethical position or normative judgment (Friedman, 1953, 
p. 4). As this process developed, ethics was discarded from economics, as it diverged further from the 
other social science (Sen, 1987; Putnam, 2002). For a recent debate on the relationship between ethics 
and economics, see De Martino and McCloskey et al. (2016). Nevertheless, many scholars consider 
fictitious the distinction between positive and normative economics: ‘a modernist chimera founded on 
the rigid dogmas of positivism, the total structure of neoclassical economics is normative in nature on 
account of the special role it ascribes to the postulate of rationality and the fact that the theorist must 
necessarily invoke non-cognitive mental notions which he or she must interpret in subjectivist and 
evaluative terms’ (Keita, 1997, p. 82). 
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a. An axiomatic set of prerequisites (the proprieties of individual preferences) 
described by a mathematical language;
11
  
b. A specific role for causality (economic relations usually depend on personal 
expectations);
12
   
c. Formal models that are considered able to describe the real world (general 
economic equilibrium model took a Bourbakian approach);
13
  
d. The use of microeconomics to explain aggregate phenomena intended as a 
method of making aggregations by assuming that the actions of individuals are 
the outcomes of optimising decision-making processes, and that equilibrium is 
the final outcome.
14
  
 
These fundamentals, however, show that neoclassical economics rests on hypotheses and 
assumptions that are not just simple (in terms of Occam’s razor) but oversimplified and 
inconsistent with reality.
15
 Furthermore, their simplicity becomes apparent and is misleading 
(this would be an example where Occam’s razor retards rather than enhances economic 
knowledge (Reid, 1987)). In fact, economic agents, as well as social aggregates, do not follow 
linear paths of behaviour: hence, the completeness, symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity 
axioms of preferences can be violated, as has been demonstrated in different ways (Allais, 
1953; Kahneman and Tversky, 1981). Furthermore, the transition from a description of 
individual economic behaviour to a description of complex social groups is fallacious, because 
it is based on the idea that complex systems are simply the sum of their single components 
(individuals), which is not valid (Albin and Foley, 1998; Israel, 2005). In describing social 
behaviour, the theory of expectations can be a guideline for economists (Lucas and Sargent, 
1981), but it does not guarantee a correct and robust economic forecast (Davidson, 1982). 
Moreover, the lack of realism in neoclassical economics is one of its main faults that reduce 
the complexity of explananda and the possibility of moving closer to a proper explanation 
(Hodgson, 2004); 
The lack of realism (or realisticness as a property of models
16
) in neoclassical 
economics’ initial assumptions and the way they are adopted to reduce complexity in 
describing decision making processes are two interconnected aspects of neoclassical 
economics and thus have to be analysed as related, in order to understand how they make 
neoclassical economics problematic in terms of a proper description of economic behaviour. 
To be concerned about the realism of a theory implies a concern about the degree to 
which models represent and resemble the chunks of the real world they seek to engage with, 
as well as between theoretical assumptions and empirical models (based entirely on data). 
The collection of data is the very first methodological issue in constructing any empirical 
model: relevant data serve to test or calibrate models (Knuutila, 2009; Morgan, 2001). These 
                                                          
11
 Rational choice theory is grounded on the axioms of consumer preference that has been modelled 
with the aim of allowing a mathematical interpretation of utility functions, of portraying rational behaviour 
as optimal, and of deriving proper demand curves.  
12
 Rational choice theory models individual expectations, which may be adaptive and rational, in a way 
that implies a direct and simple behaviour: the economising behaviour of maximisation. 
13
 Although at a certain point, neoclassical economists rejected the use of physics to explain formal 
models, like general economic equilibrium, in favour of  pure bourbakian mathematics (Giocoli, 2003), 
as in the case of Debreu (Weintraub, 2002).  
14
 Macroeconomics is reduced to microeconomic analysis: macroeconomic phenomena can be 
explained by deriving them from microeconomics parameters, such as individual preferences and 
expectations. For a critical view on this methodological reductionism see Hoover (2001; 2010) and King 
(2012). 
15
 For some scholars, this is enough to consider it as a form of powerful rhetorical discourse (Nelson 
2001; Mitchell, 2016), and for some scholars of other disciplines as a pseudo-science (Patterson and 
Fosse, 2015). 
16
 See footnote 3. 
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models are able to make hypotheses testable, problem solving and prediction being the two 
main aims of science. Scientists and scholars of social disciplines are ‘empirical modellers… 
making logical inferences based on data, to understand what is going on and what will 
happen’ (Thompson, 2011, p. 1). The lack of realism, which remains the main fault of 
neoclassical economics from a methodological point of view,
17
 became explicit in Friedman’s 
1953 definition of positive economics, where the concordance between a theory’s predictions 
and observed phenomena is the only thing that matters.
18
 In fact, Friedman said, a discourse 
on ‘unrealism’ is pointless, and theory can only yield predictions that are good 
approximations; furthermore, assumptions cannot test an economic theory, because they are 
ambiguous, and a criticism based on the discrepancy between assumptions and the real 
world is rooted in ‘the confusion between descriptive accuracy and analytical relevance’ 
(Friedman, 1953, p. 33). Friedman’s conclusion is his well-known as-if principle:  
 
‘it is frequently convenient to present such a hypothesis by stating that the 
phenomena it is desired to predict behave in the world of observation as if 
they occurred in a hypothetical and highly simplified world containing only the 
forces that the hypothesis asserts to be important’ (Friedman, 1953, p. 40).
19
 
 
Although recently Friedman’s anti-realism has been reconsidered (Hoover, 2009; Mäki, 
2009),
20
 his methodology has been overtly criticised since its publication (Hausman, 1992b, 
Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008; Gilboa, 2009; Mäki, 2011). Ernst Nagel’s critique of Friedman’s 
methodology is based on the fact that Friedman failed to distinguish between three kinds of 
‘unrealism’: the lack of an ‘exhaustive’ description; the possible accordance between an 
unrealistic assumption and a correct theory; and the instrumental use of unrealistic 
assumptions when they reveal discrepancies between pure theory and described phenomena 
(Nagel, 1963).
21
  
The critique of Friedman’s methodology – the so-called Friedman’s as-if, or 
Friedman’s twist, as Samuelson stigmatised it – ‘has paved the way for an internal debate in 
economics around the falsifiability of a theory, and the possibility to develop a theory of 
empirical contest as well as to provide testable axioms for describing individual behaviour’ 
(Chambers, Enchenique and Shmaya, 2014). In Samuelson’s words, ‘F-twist is fundamentally 
wrong, in thinking that unrealism in the sense of factual inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree 
                                                          
17
 Robert Lucas, for example, claimed that the insistence of realism damages the scientific aspects of 
economics (Lucas, 1981). 
18
 Friedman’s essays, and particular Chapter I on methodology, have been called ‘the most cited, the 
most influential, the most controversial piece[s] of methodological writing in twentieth century 
economics’ (Mäki, 2009c, p. xvii), and ‘a marketing masterpiece’ (Caldwell, 1982, p. 173). 
19
 Blaug’s well-known battle for a realistic methodology of economics (1992), based on a falsificationist 
critique of both mainstream and heterodox economics, led him to a normative approach mainly as a 
result of ‘meta-theoretical claims about economics often descriptively unrealistic’ (Mäki, 2013a, p. 89). It 
was Hutchison (1938) who introduced Popper’s falsification principle (Popper, 1959[1935]) into 
economics, as an attack on Mises’ apriorism (Hands, 2001). For an extensive consideration of the 
problem of demarcation in economics, see Latsis at al. (1976) and Mäki (2008). For a historical 
reconstruction of the legacy of Friedman’s principle within economics, see Mäki (2009b), and Mayer 
(2009). 
20
 For a more complex and recent analysis of Friedman’s as-if principle, see Mäki at al. (2009). 
21
 A discourse about the realism of initial assumptions in economics, and more generally within the 
social sciences, should take account of the distinction between abstraction (the process of focusing on a 
particular aspect of a phenomenon to build up a model able to explain it) and idealisation (the tendency 
to isolate an economic phenomenon as if it worked without any external interference). They are 
independent methods of reasoning. In the process of idealisation, a distinction between internal validity 
(the correct use of data) and external validity (the actual degree of generalisability) should be made in 
order to test a model (Rol, 2008).  According to Runde (1997), neoclassical economics adopts 
idealisations to facilitate the application of a deductive method.  
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of approximation is anything but a demerit for a theory or hypothesis (or set of hypotheses)’ 
(Samuelson, 1966, p. 1774). Samuelson’s position against Friedman’s methodological 
approach has been criticised by Machlup, who, referring to Samuelson’s ‘operationally 
meaningful theorems’ (mentioned before), claimed that the best results of Samuelson, as a 
theorist, are deduced from unrealistic assumptions: ‘Samuelson produces his best work when 
he deduces from unrealistic assumptions general theoretical propositions’ (Machlup, 1964, p. 
735).  
Unlike Friedman, Samuelson claimed that the realism of assumptions matters and 
introduced the so-called Samuelson’s razor valid for both physics and economics 
(Samuelson, 1966). In Samuelson’s reply to Machlup, he reminded the latter that his doctrine 
of revealed preference is grounded in realism, and he explicitly mentioned Occam’s razor as 
a ‘primarily aesthetic’ tool to criticise unrealistic assumptions in science; Samuelson used 
Occam’s razor’s logical blade to justify his position: ‘Occam’s razor has cut away every 
zipper, collar, shirt, and fig leaf’ (Samuelson, 1964, p. 738).  
A possible explanation for Samuelson’s use of Occam’s razor purely as a logical tool 
can be found in the fact that, as Hands clarifies, he (along with Friedman and Hutchison) was 
influenced by positivist ideas:  
 
‘[Friedman’s] purposes of positive (as opposed to normative) economics, the 
truth of the assumptions of a theory do not matter at all, [because] the only 
thing that matters in deciding among various economic theories is which one 
is most successful in making empirical predictions. The Theory that makes 
the most accurate predictions in the relevant domain is the best theory, and if 
it employs “unrealistic” assumptions this should not in any way detract from 
its success as a positive scientific theory. (…) [In] Samuelson’s 
methodological position, scientific theories merely describe the empirical 
evidence and do not go beyond the evidence to explain any deeper, 
underlying, or hidden causes of the phenomena. On this view, science can 
indeed provide explanations, but such explanations are independent of the 
cognitive content of the scientific theories involved (…) such descriptivism 
was representative of early (but not later) logical positivism’ (Hands 2001, pp. 
54-63). 
 
They were still embedded in the cultural framework of economic positivism, i.e., the 
application of positivist methodology to economics (Wilber and Wisman, 1975), and the 
promotion of neoclassical economics as the only scientific approach to explain individual and 
social behaviour in economic model building (Boland, 2003).  Although ‘economic positivism’ 
has different nuances, and can be very confusing, the idea of ‘positive economics is mostly a 
matter of rhetoric’ (Boland, 1997, p. 117), and Occam’s razor’s power of rhetoric is highly 
enlightening.  
Let us now turn to the other aspect of economics with which the lack of realism is 
connected: the reduction of complexity. In neoclassical economics, the reduction of 
complexity started with the introduction of homo oeconomicus, a rational maximiser of a utility 
function, and it continued with the application of individualism to describe social institutions. 
This process led to rational choice theory, focused on the methodological assumption that 
individuals are rational economic agents able to rank their preferences and, given a budget 
constraint, choose the optimal solution. The story of rational choice theory began with 
Pareto’s concept of revealed preferences, later developed by Samuelson’s revealed 
preference axioms (Mas-Colell, 1978), and it finally ended up with Becker’s economic 
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approach to human behaviour as the combination of ‘maximising behaviour, market 
equilibrium and stable preferences’ (Becker, 1976, p. 7). Rational choice theory was dominant 
in the discipline from the 1950s, with Friedman-Samuelson’s systematisation, up to the 
1990s, when some alternative theories were advanced without successfully replacing it 
(Moscati, 2016).  
Rational choice theory uses an ‘oversimplified pattern of human behaviour [that] 
ignores the irreducibility of wants (…) the background for unpredictable results is reduced to 
probability’ (Georgescu-Roegen, 1954, p. 531). Rosenberg has defined the neoclassical 
reduction of complexity in describing economic behaviour as a ‘formalised folk psychology’ 
based on subjectivism and preferences, which fails to define the real causes of individual 
behaviour (Rosenberg, 1992). Under strict rationality, the complex problems associated with 
the acquisition of human knowledge are reduced and oversimplified in the automatism of 
human behaviour (reduced to maximisation of an expected utility function).  
Summing up, neoclassical economics, grounded on ‘operationally meaningful 
hypotheses’ (à la Samuelson), on the notion of positive economics (à la Friedman), and on 
economic agents depicted as fully rational Bayesian maximisers of subjective utility, does not 
explain the complexity of human actions in a realistic way. In Buchanan’s words:  
 
‘The subjective elements of our discipline are defined precisely within the 
boundaries between the positive, predictive science of the orthodox model 
(…) The recognition of the domain of an operationally meaningful economic 
theory does not carry with it any implication concerning the practical 
usefulness of this theory in making predictions in the real world’ (Buchanan 
1982, pp. 8-16). 
 
2. Heterodox economics’ adoption of Occam’s razor parsimony blade: the role of 
heuristic 
 
The common intent of many so-called heterodox approaches to economics is to work towards 
a major revision of neoclassical methodological assumptions and to open up alternative 
theoretical perspectives able to consider, in a more realistic way, the interconnection between 
individual dynamics and social phenomena. Recently, some heterodox economists used 
heuristics in a serious attempt to separate themselves from the neoclassical model of 
economic rationality: unlike neoclassical economics, they adopt Occam’s razor as a heuristic 
rule of thumb and accuse neoclassical economists of applying a mathematical-deductive 
method to a series of inappropriate (unrealistic) conditions, such as using individual 
preference axioms in a static context. In such a context, heterodox approaches consider the 
lack of realism in neoclassical economics as the most severe limitation within the discipline, 
and they introduce alternative models, such as rhetoric, persuasion, metaphors, and 
heuristics (McCloskey, 1983; Lawson, 1997; Mäki, 1998b; 2012; Hausman, 1998; Gigerenzer, 
2008; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Keen, 2001; Lewis et al., 2004; Lavoie, 2014).  
In the previous section we have just considered some faults of neoclassical 
economics with regard to Occam’s razor logical blade. But what about the advantages of 
using Occam’s razor heuristic blade in economics? Advantages are mainly focused on the 
possibility of building up a coherent and realistic theory of human behaviour and economic 
dynamics in social terms. As Simon recalled:  
 
‘Occam’s razor has a double edge. Succinctness of statement is not the only 
measure of a theory’s simplicity. Occam understood his rule as 
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recommending theories that make no more assumptions than necessary to 
account for the phenomena. A theory of profit or utility maximisation can be 
stated more briefly than a satisficing theory, but the former makes much 
stronger assumptions than the latter about the human cognitive system. 
Hence in the case before us, the two edges of the razor cut in opposite ways’ 
(Simon 1992, pp. 345-346). 
 
To describe economic behaviour in the most realistic and coherent way, Occam’s razor has to 
be adopted as a heuristic rule of thumb (Lauth, 1997; Burgess, 1998), which gives 
precedence to parsimony rather than to simplicity. This will allow economists to better explain 
the complexity of the object of economics (individual and social dynamics within a specific 
context) and to reach a more realistic explanation (the causal inference and the connected 
relations between means and ends in individual and social dynamics) of its own explanandum 
(the object of economics). In fact, the object of economics is complex, and individual decision 
making, as well as social dynamics, do not, I argue, necessary follow the strict regularities 
imposed by neoclassical economics, as social dynamics are not simply the sum of individual 
dynamics as implicitly asserted by neoclassical economics.  
Against neoclassical economics, which reduces the complexity of its explanandum 
(economic behaviour) and loses realism as a result, Hayek retains the complexity of the 
explanandum and stresses the importance of reducing any lack of realism. The following 
passage, quoted from Hayek, illustrates this point:  
 
‘[Model building] brings out an important feature which all explanations 
possess but to very different degrees. (…) To the physicist the value of a 
model (especially of a mathematical model represented by a set of equations) 
normally consists in the fact that he can ascertain and insert the relevant 
variables and thus derive the quantitative values of the events to be predicted 
or explained. Yet in [social sciences] similar models are regularly used 
although the values of the variables cannot in fact be ascertained. (…) The 
service of a theory [within the realm of social sciences] would perhaps be 
better described by the term orientation than by speaking of prediction. 
Although such a theory does not tell us precisely what to expect, it will still 
make the world around us a more familiar world in which we can move with 
greater confidence’ (Hayek, 1967, p. 18). 
 
Occam’s razor, intended as a heuristic tool, has at least two advantages: it makes it possible 
to produce realistic models describing human behaviour and social phenomena;
22
 and it 
provides an easy procedure for problem solving, based on practical experience, one that does 
not guarantee an optimal solution, but one that can nevertheless provide a satisfactory one in 
an uncertain context.
23
 An important turning point in establishing the advantages of Occam’s 
razor as a heuristic device capable of providing a realistic description of economic behaviour 
as well as economic phenomena was Simon’s model of bounded rationality, based on the 
                                                          
22
 As in Lawson’s distinction between agency and structure intended as two dimensions of social reality 
that condition one other (Lawson, 2013). 
23
 As Karl Menger, the mathematician son of Carl the economist, had claimed about the use of Occam’s 
razor in social science modelling: ‘It is vain to try to do with less what requires more. This more general 
formulation of the counterpart of Occam's law, besides denouncing ontological gaps, may also be 
construed as a semantic maxim opposing equivocations. (…) Under certain circumstances, the 
methodological tool that is needed is not a razor but a prism resolving conceptual medleys into the 
spectra of their meanings or, if one wishes to remain in the tonsorial domain of the razor, a comb 
disentangling and straightening out the various threads of thought’ (Menger, 1961, p. 332). 
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satisficing principle rather than maximising behaviour (Simon 1955; p. 1957). According to 
Simon, ‘human beings have reasons for what they do, but they seldom maximise utility, (…) 
given the complexities and uncertainties of the choice situations they face’ (Simon, 2001, p. 
57). Although Simon did not explicitly consider the choice of parsimony over simplicity as a 
superior criterion, neither did he talk about realism,
24
 I consider his critique of neoclassical 
economics’ modelling of economic behaviour as an implicit application of the heuristic blade 
of Occam’s razor, focused on parsimony. If we intend satisficing as a humanly rational 
strategy, it appears simpler and more frugal than maximising because in this scenario, 
individuals are following a rule of thumb in a dynamic context; while in the neoclassical 
scenario, individuals are optimisers in a static and non-realistic context of perfect knowledge 
and complete information. To seek optima is not a reasonable strategy, because finding 
optima requires unrealistic assumptions in formal modelling.
25
  
In this context, Gigerenzer’s notion of a ‘fast and frugal’ heuristic is one of the best 
examples of an ‘occamite’ approach, based on parsimony, in explaining the decision making 
process (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001): a fast heuristic requires only a short time to solve a 
problem, and a frugal heuristic solves a problem with the information actually available 
(Gigerenzer, 2008). In terms of Occam’s razor, neoclassical economics, based on rational 
assumptions, makes the building of economics as a science more complicated, rather than 
simpler, and more inaccurate rather than more correct. In Hayek’s words: ‘this is a 
consequence of the fundamental difficulty of any complete explanation of highly complex 
phenomena and not merely of an insufficient development of economic theory’ (Hayek 1967, 
p. 259).  
 
Conclusions 
 
In one regard, Occam’s razor is the more sophisticated and elegant version of what is usually 
considered common sense (Fenk, 2010). At an initial glance, Occam advocates simplicity and 
parsimony in order to reduce the risk of mistakes. The presumption that an increase in the 
number of hypotheses will increase the chances of formulating a wrong theory may be valid in 
physics, but it is misleading in the social sciences. When applied to the social sciences, 
economics in particular, Occam’s razor logical blade gives us a model that lacks realism, 
whereas Occam’s razor parsimony blade supplies a powerful heuristic: it does not reduce the 
complexity of an explanandum, but rather, it is able to cope with it in better terms, that of  
parsimony. The main fault of neoclassical economics is with its initial assumptions, which are 
oversimplified and unrealistic, both in terms of individual behaviour and in terms of social 
institutions. Neoclassical economists try to reduce the complexity of individual and social 
dynamics rather than to describe them in realistic terms. Rational choice theory, based on the 
general validity of the expected utility function, and general economic equilibrium, are 
representations of individuals and society somehow disconnected from the real world. In 
Simon’s terms, the epistemology of neoclassical economics is inconsistent with our 
knowledge of actual human choice behaviour; in Hayek’s terms, it is an abuse of reason. 
There are many alternatives to neoclassical economics. Regardless of the differences 
among heterodox economic approaches, their main concern is to build up an economic 
discipline capable of defining economic agents and institutions in a way that makes 
adherence to reality more effective, and that is able to include complexity. Occam’s razor 
                                                          
24
 I owe this observation to Cserne’s comment on Simon in his referee report. 
25
 About Simon’s concept of bounded rationality, it is important to underline that it reduces the amount of 
information available to neoclassical homo oeconomicus, but does not radically deny  the model of 
perfect knowledge. Nevertheless, Simon’s bounded rationality broke the wall of neoclassical economics 
and many heterodox approaches to economics went through it. 
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parsimony blade allows complexity by adopting heuristic to describe human dynamics. This 
process opens up a more pluralistic view within economics.  
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